Chapter

Śakyatāvacchedaka

Jonardon Ganeri

in Artha

Published in print July 2011 | ISBN: 9780198074137
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780199082131 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198074137.003.0007

Series: Foundations of Philosophy in India

Śakyatāvacchedaka

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This chapter addresses two Nyāya authors who deny that the mandate needs to state the mode under which an understander has to think of the referent; to use Wittgenstein's metaphor, it can prescribe by showing, not stating. Gadādhara has arrived at a ‘two-component’ theory of meaning, with modes of thought taking the place of intensionally individuated properties. Naiyāyika Raghunātha Śiromań categorically rejects Vardhamāna's thesis. Gadādhara, Raghunātha, and Raghunātha* each present a different reading to the knowledge-of-meaning ascription. Gadādhara argues that the sort of knowledge involved in the causal explanation of a person's competence depends on the type of term. It is possible that there are terms for which the requisite item of knowledge must have the form of (Raghunātha), other terms for which it has the form of (Raghunātha*), and still other terms for which it has the form of (Gadādhara).

Keywords: Gadādhara; Naiyāyika Raghunātha Śiromań; Vardhamāna; Nyāya; knowledge-of-meaning ascription; knowledge

Chapter.  7079 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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