Shared and Collective Responsibility


in Responsibility

Published in print May 1995 | ISBN: 9780198235781
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679117 | DOI:
Shared and Collective Responsibility

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The shareability of reasons makes it possible to share responsibility, and this chapter considers the ways we can be responsible for actions taken by another, either on our instructions or on our advice, or because we were in some sense accomplices before or after the act. Collective responsibility can extend a long way, far further than is comfortable. We often find ourselves feeling responsible for what our ancestors, compatriots, or co-religionists have done, and seek some means of dissociating ourselves and disavowing actions taken by members of our group.

Keywords: reasons; responsibility; actions; accomplice

Chapter.  4518 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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