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This chapter introduces the idea of a particular sort of philosophical naturalism — folk naturalism — and explains what this doctrine says about action. It describes its commitment to a reconstructive analysis of action in folk terms, but ones thought to be acceptable to the naturalist. It proposes three theories of action, pointing out a crucial assumption that all three share, and then focuses on the theory favoured by folk naturalism, the causal theory of action. The chapter explains some of its main ideas and, in particular, focuses on the requirement of rationalization that is part of the causal theory's requirements for action.
Keywords: philosophy of action; folk naturalism; causal theory of action; rationalization
Chapter. 16675 words.
Subjects: Metaphysics
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