Chapter

The Causal Theory of Action

Ruben David-Hillel

in Action and its Explanation

Published in print May 2003 | ISBN: 9780198235880
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679155 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235880.003.0005
The Causal Theory of Action

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This chapter addresses the causal theory of action. It clarifies the idea of belief and argues that there is no genuine sense of ‘belief’ in which there are sufficient beliefs to meet the requirements of the causal theory of action. It describes some possible responses by the causal theorist and rejects them. Finally, the chapter discusses the category of mental action and claims that the causal theorist cannot provide a convincing reconstructive analysis for an important subset of them.

Keywords: philosophy of action; causal theory of action; belief; mental action

Chapter.  19692 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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