Chapter

Consensus, Rationality, and Epistemic Morality

Nicholas Rescher

in Pluralism

Published in print September 1995 | ISBN: 9780198236016
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679162 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236016.003.0001

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

Consensus, Rationality, and Epistemic Morality

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This chapter evaluates the importance of consensus in rationality and epistemic morality. It discusses two different approaches to the prospect of disagreement and dissensus and it argues in favour of the policy of dissensus management or the pluralist approach to cognitive, evaluative, and practical affairs. It contends that dissensus and diversity can often play a highly constructive role in human affairs and that contemporary partisans of consensus methodology seriously overestimate the need and desirability of consensualism.

Keywords: consensus; rationality; epistemic morality; disagreement; dissensus

Chapter.  5646 words. 

Subjects: Social and Political Philosophy

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