Chapter

The Problems of a Consensus Theory of Truth

Nicholas Rescher

in Pluralism

Published in print September 1995 | ISBN: 9780198236016
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679162 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236016.003.0003

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

The Problems of a Consensus Theory of Truth

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This chapter discusses the flaws and problems related to a consensus theory of truth. It suggests that consensus has to be construed in terms of addressing common issues in a common way, but this notion produces a question of how consilience bears on the issue of truth. It evaluates Jürgen Habermas' philosophy concerning consensus and truth and suggests that his rationality via consensus approach is predicated upon very unrealistic expectations of consensus because it fails to provide a means toward achieving something akin to rationality as traditionally conceived.

Keywords: consensus; truth; Jürgen Habermas; rationality; philosophy

Chapter.  7353 words. 

Subjects: Social and Political Philosophy

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