Pluralism without Indifferentism

Nicholas Rescher

in Pluralism

Published in print September 1995 | ISBN: 9780198236016
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679162 | DOI:

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

Pluralism without Indifferentism

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This chapter evaluates the possibility of a cognitive pluralism without indifferentist relativism. It suggests that pluralism is compatible with preferentialism and that a rationalistic preferentialism which insists on the correctness of one particular alternative is perfectly compatible with a pluralism that acknowledges that others may be fully rationally warranted and entitled to hold the variant position they adopt. This chapter concludes that it is fallacious to insist on a quest for consensus on the grounds that dissensus and pluralism are rationally intolerable.

Keywords: cognitive pluralism; indifferentist relativism; preferentialism; dissensus; rationality

Chapter.  10141 words. 

Subjects: Social and Political Philosophy

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