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This chapter evaluates the possibility of a cognitive pluralism without indifferentist relativism. It suggests that pluralism is compatible with preferentialism and that a rationalistic preferentialism which insists on the correctness of one particular alternative is perfectly compatible with a pluralism that acknowledges that others may be fully rationally warranted and entitled to hold the variant position they adopt. This chapter concludes that it is fallacious to insist on a quest for consensus on the grounds that dissensus and pluralism are rationally intolerable.
Keywords: cognitive pluralism; indifferentist relativism; preferentialism; dissensus; rationality
Chapter. 10141 words.
Subjects: Social and Political Philosophy
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