Chapter

Self-deceit and the Socratic Paradox

L. JONATHAN COHEN

in An Essay on Belief and Acceptance

Published in print September 1995 | ISBN: 9780198236047
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679179 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236047.003.0005
Self-deceit and the Socratic Paradox

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While there may be instances wherein we are tempted to say that some people deliberately deceive themselves, self-deceit is a concept that is evidently paradoxical. Although previous proposals for resolving such may provide insufficient explanations, we may take on a different perspective that entails how self-deceit entails a suppressed thought persists despite how a person persuades himself into accepting a different belief. As such, there are also suggestions of how to resolve the Socratic paradox regarding self-control that may be just as unsatisfactory as in the former case. This chapter attempts to point out the consistencies attributed to how a particular agent's belief that he should not be conducting a certain act to how he accepts that he is actually pursuing this act.

Keywords: Socratic paradox; self-control; self-deceit; belief; acceptance; paradox

Chapter.  11328 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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