This chapter seeks to justify the contention that the notion of raw feeling is sound. It also makes clear what the intelligibility gap is. Another aim — the main one — is to develop solutions to the real problems, thereby showing how the intelligibility gap can be closed. The third aim is to make clear that the proposed solutions are solutions — to show that they require no leaps of faith. Resistance is likely from opposite directions. On one side are those who stick by the intuitions and find it hard to conceive how they could possibly be provided for by the means that will be employed. On the other side stand behaviourists, verificationists, Wittgensteinians, and eliminativists who reject the contention that there is a problem about consciousness.
Keywords: colour-blindness; consciousness; raw feeling; epiphenomenalism; behaviourism
Chapter. 11728 words.
Subjects: Philosophy of Mind
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