Truth-Value and Pretence

Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen

in Truth, Fiction, and Literature

Published in print October 1996 | ISBN: 9780198236818
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679377 | DOI:

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

Truth-Value and Pretence

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This chapter begins with a discussion of falsity thesis, which states that ‘pure fiction’, by definition, consists of false sentences. It then considers an alternative to the falsity thesis, the no-truth-value view of fictive utterance. There are at least three versions of this: (i) sentences in works of fiction are neither true nor false because their (existential) presuppositions are false; (ii) sentences in works of fiction are neither true nor false because the sentences are not asserted; and (iii) it is inappropriate (mistaken, etc.) to ascribe truth or falsity to sentences in works of fiction. The chapter discusses the precise place pretence occupies in the practice of story-telling and what kinds of pretence there are.

Keywords: fiction; falsity thesis; fictive utterance; no-truth-value thesis; pretence

Chapter.  9383 words. 

Subjects: Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art

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