Chapter

Towards a Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony

Miranda Fricker

in Epistemic Injustice

Published in print June 2007 | ISBN: 9780198237907
Published online September 2007 | e-ISBN: 9780191706844 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.003.0004
 Towards a Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony

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This chapter presents a diagnostic account of the state of play in the epistemology of testimony, and proposes a virtue epistemological non-inferentialist alternative. This account depends on arguments substantiating a parallel between the moral cognitivist account of virtuous perception, and a proposed account of epistemically virtuous perception that the virtuous hearer possesses owing to a well-trained testimonial sensibility. He perceives his interlocutor as more, or less, credible in what she is telling him.

Keywords: non-inferentialism; virtue epistemology; moral cognitivism; testimonial sensibility

Chapter.  11498 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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