Chapter

The Virtue of Testimonial Justice

Miranda Fricker

in Epistemic Injustice

Published in print June 2007 | ISBN: 9780198237907
Published online September 2007 | e-ISBN: 9780191706844 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.003.0005
 The Virtue of Testimonial Justice

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This chapter develops an initial account of a virtue to counteract the ever-present risk of doing testimonial injustices: the virtue of testimonial justice. The hearer who possesses this virtue reliably neutralizes the impact of prejudice in her credibility judgements. Naïve and corrective forms of the virtue are distinguished. Issues of culpability are explored and the historical conditions under which one might be non-culpable in perpetrating a testimonial injustice. A distinction between routine and exceptional judgements is made and related to the question of moral relativism.

Keywords: blame; luck; moral relativism; prejudice; credibility judgements

Chapter.  9841 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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