Chapter

Truth and Beyond

Christian F. R. Illies

in The Grounds of Ethical Judgement

Published in print July 2003 | ISBN: 9780198238324
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679612 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238324.003.0006

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs

Truth and Beyond

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This chapter puts aside the epistemological level of discourse and outlines the reach of the argument from normative consistency. It shows how the argument from normative consistency can provide an apt and useful basis for the main tenets of moral realism. That ethical foundationalism is dangerous is an objection more prominent in philosophical than in ordinary discourse. However, the view that ethical foundationalism is utterly doomed to fail is the common view of many philosophers and non-philosophers alike. These two criticisms are examined, first in general terms and second in the version of Alasdair MacIntyre. The truth thesis of moral realism is discussed, along with truth and intersubjectivity, truth and tyranny, how moral beliefs can motivate, a typology of true (or right) moral judgements, and the teleological structure of rational agency.

Keywords: normative consistency; moral realism; moral beliefs; rational agency; truth; ethical foundationalism; freedom; moral judgements

Chapter.  13454 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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