Chapter

Philosophical Theories and Metaphysical Schemes

Michael Morris

in The Good and the True

Published in print November 1992 | ISBN: 9780198239444
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679919 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.003.0002

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs

Philosophical Theories and Metaphysical Schemes

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This chapter aims to provide a philosophical theory of content. ‘Content’ here means conceptual content—the content of propositional attitudes. A conception of what philosophical theories should do presupposes a very general metaphysical science. The fundamental objections to the resulting theories trace back to the adoption of the contentious metaphysics of ‘naturalism’. Conceptualism, Platoism, and No-Theory view are the three fundamental approaches to metaphysical issues. What is needed is the development of a general metaphysical theory to provide the constraints that a philosophical theory of content must meet. A developed form of conceptualism is the best general metaphysical theory. This chapter hopes to provide a philosophical theory (or analysis, or reduction) of any particular subject that should accept this general theory.

Keywords: philosophy; theory of content; metaphysical science; naturalism; conceptualism; Platoism; No-Theory view

Chapter.  3871 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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