Chapter

Conceptualism is Kantian

Michael Morris

in The Good and the True

Published in print November 1992 | ISBN: 9780198239444
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679919 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.003.0003

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs

Conceptualism is Kantian

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter suggests that ‘interest’ in conceptualism's tenet is naturally read in line with something like Kant's conception of a scientific metaphysics. It is the one which may issue from and be testable by a scientific general metaphysical theory. Scientific general metaphysical theory incorporates an operable condition of adequacy for metaphysical explanations which enables us to test some metaphysical explanations effectively, and allows us always to imagine the testing of any significant metaphysical explanation. This chapter also argues that the demand for a scientific metaphysics is incompatible with Platonism; and that familiar objections to Platonism presuppose a commitment to something like a scientific metaphysics. Lastly, this chapter tries to undermine two intuitive arguments of Platonism: two inhabitants have different conceptual schemes and two concept-possessors must think about at least some of the same things.

Keywords: interesting conceptualism; Kant; scientific metaphysics; Platonism; intuitive arguments

Chapter.  4566 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.