Chapter

A Proposal for a Scientific Metaphysics

Michael Morris

in The Good and the True

Published in print November 1992 | ISBN: 9780198239444
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679919 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.003.0006

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs

A Proposal for a Scientific Metaphysics

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The condition of factual equivalence for reduction determines what it is for two expressions for the same object, property, or fact. Informative metaphysical explanations cannot be conceptual equivalence. Two expressions for the same things may nevertheless express different concepts or ways of thinking. The same thing can be thought of in different ways. Frege suggests that a particular way of thinking of an object is characterized by a particular kind of epistemological access to that object. This chapter discusses knowledge constraint and that it may be rejected by some on the grounds that it is verificationist or more generally anti-realist. Lastly, this chapter argues that we cannot insist that the direction of explanation be the same for all metaphysical explanations.

Keywords: factual equivalence; reduction; informative metaphysical explanations; conceptual equivalence; Frege; epistemology; knowledge constraint; verificationist; anti-realist

Chapter.  6966 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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