Chapter

Truth and Virtue

Michael Morris

in The Good and the True

Published in print November 1992 | ISBN: 9780198239444
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679919 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.003.0012

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs

Truth and Virtue

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This chapter aims to explain why there cannot be an evolutionary theory of content. It depends upon the idea that it is appropriate to give an evaluative theory of desire, just as it is to give an evaluative theory of belief. Orectic attitudes are play roles which are combined and contrasted with the role of belief in the explanation of behaviour. A general kind of value which truth belongs to is called alethic value. Holism of assessability states that no response can be assessable in terms of orectic values without being assessable in terms of alethic value. Also discussed here is the idea of what is morally assessable. The two crucial claims of this chapter are: we should adopt an evaluative theory of Orectic attitudes, and the thesis of the holism of assessability is true.

Keywords: evolutionary theory of content; desire; belief; Orectic attitudes; alethic value; holism of assessability; morality

Chapter.  12168 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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