Freedom and Natural Order

N. M. L. Nathan

in Will and World

Published in print January 1992 | ISBN: 9780198239543
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679957 | DOI:
Freedom and Natural Order

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No incoherence has emerged in the desire for extra possibility freedom. When decisions free in that sense are wanted for the sake of moral responsibility, then the desire has a doubtful internal proposition. But even if someone, finally unable to accept the objectivist metaphysic which ordinary conceptions of morality seem to presuppose, were to stop wanting there to be free decisions for the sake of what is ordinarily called moral responsibility, his desire for their existence would probably still survive in one of the forms discussed earlier. This chapter examines the third question about want and belief conflicts proposed previously: whether there is good evidence for not-p which is better evidence than any evidence for p.

Keywords: objectivist metaphysics; incoherence; freedom; free decisions; moral responsibility; internal propositions

Chapter.  7368 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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