Chapter

Free Will and Free Action

N. M. L. Nathan

in Will and World

Published in print January 1992 | ISBN: 9780198239543
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679957 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239543.003.0007
Free Will and Free Action

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This book has now made progress with all of the questions of Chapter 2, so far as they concern one's central want and belief conflicts about free decisions. In the first-order conflicts which are, as the book argued or assumed, likely to afflict one, S-free, C-free, and *-free decisions are what one wants there to be. In none of these conflicts could he find any incoherence in the content of the desire. Only those desires based on objectivist beliefs about moral responsibility seemed to be based on doubtful internal propositions. On neither demystified nor Lewis-style assumptions about counterfactuals did there appear to be any thesis of natural order which was both incompatible with the existence of *-free decisions and supported by good evidence.

Keywords: want conflicts; belief conflicts; Lewis; incoherence; desire; free decisions; moral responsibility; internal propositions

Chapter.  7937 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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