N. M. L. Nathan

in Will and World

Published in print January 1992 | ISBN: 9780198239543
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191679957 | DOI:

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Want and belief conflicts about free decisions are still liable to afflict a person who is not in the least impressed by the old and new difficulties earlier discussed about how extra possibility freedom can be reconciled with order in nature, and has no desire either for sole authorship or an unattainable ‘true responsibility’. The concept of a decision, like the more general concept of volition, is the concept of an object with a quality. And for anyone who naively believes that any such object exists a distinction lies in wait between experiences as of there being objects with the quality in question, and objects in that case with that quality whose existence is independent of experiences as of their existence.

Keywords: free decisions; freedom; nature; volition; qualities; true responsibility; want conflicts; belief conflicts; extra possibility freedom

Chapter.  9295 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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