Chapter

Knowing that One Knows

Bimal Krishna Matilal

in Perception

Published in print December 1991 | ISBN: 9780198239765
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680014 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239765.003.0006

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

Knowing that One Knows

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It is generally agreed that if something is known, it must be true or it must exist. Nyāya says that this fact does not allow one to say that if one knows then necessarily one knows that one knows and this holds even when one is quite convinced about what one knows. One may in fact be absolutely sure about what one cognizes but such a certainty by itself does not amount to knowledge. The first section of this chapter examines rival theories about knowledge of knowledge. The second section develops the Buddhist position on ‘self-awareness’. The third section explores the question ‘Must I be aware that I am aware?’ The fourth section analyzes the Nyāya view about knowing that one knows. The fifth section describes inference, confirmation, and introspection.

Keywords: knowledge; self-awareness; inference; introspection; confirmation

Chapter.  16403 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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