Chapter

Universals

Bimal Krishna Matilal

in Perception

Published in print December 1991 | ISBN: 9780198239765
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680014 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239765.003.0013

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

Universals

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Discussion about the problem of universals usually starts with Plato's theory of forms along with Aristotle's critique of forms and his own doctrine of universals. ln the Indian context the starting-point has always been the early Vaisesika-sūtra discussion of ‘existent-ness’ and ‘generic properties’. The second and third sections of this chapter look briefly at Bharṭrhari's psychological nominalism or holism as well as Diṅnāga's apoha nominalism. Diṅnāga agreed with Bharṭrhari thesis; however, the major disagreement with Bharṭrhari probably lies in Diṅnāga's view that the naked object can be grasped or is grasped by purely sensory awareness, and the pure percept is therefore ineffable and self-cognized. The fourth section discusses mentalism and realism. The last section deals with the ontology and semantics of the discussion on universals and particulars.

Keywords: real universals; holistic ontology; mentalism; realism; Bharṭrhari; Diṅnāga

Chapter.  20079 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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