Chapter

Values and Valuing

A. E. Denham

in Metaphor and Moral Experience

Published in print July 2000 | ISBN: 9780198240105
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680076 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.003.0003

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs

Values and Valuing

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The combination of Platonic requirements on objectivity and those imposed by the role of values in ordinary practical reasoning appears to be fatal, at least, for any theory of value which eschews appeal to transcendental postulates. Plato's transcendental metaphysics — his theory of forms — yields a conception of moral values which radically distances them from familiar human experience. Were values like Plato's forms, they would have to be eternal, invariant, and wholly mind-independent; their existence and specific character could be in no way determined by one's (merely finite and infinitely variable) evaluative beliefs and attitudes. This chapter also discusses judgement-dependent concepts of moral value and presents an analogy between values and secondary qualities.

Keywords: moral values; Plato; secondary qualities; judgement-dependent concepts; objectivity; theory of forms; moral judgements

Chapter.  10599 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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