Chapter

Converging on Values: Cognition and Sentiment

A. E. Denham

in Metaphor and Moral Experience

Published in print July 2000 | ISBN: 9780198240105
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680076 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.003.0005

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs

Converging on Values: Cognition and Sentiment

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This chapter reconsiders the intuitive conception of truth which any account of ‘qualified judgements’ and ‘suitable subjects’ will have to subserve. There are many alternative conceptions of truth; philosophers have characterised it variously in terms of correspondence, coherence, conventional warrant, and idealised assertibility. A minimalist conception of truth is not committed to any constitutive account of the truth-predicate as it applies to any and every discourse, but is rather satisfied to assign minimal content to the idea of ‘truth-in-general’. At least two approaches to this minimalist conception may be distinguished. The first denies that truth is, strictly speaking, a property at all, while the second — known as a ‘minimalist’ approach — allows that any predicate which coincides in normative force with warranted assertibility while yet being potentially divergent from it in extension deserves the title of a truth-predicate.

Keywords: truth; minimal truth; truth-predicate; moral values; cognition; sentiment; moral judgements; moral discourse; Cognitive Command

Chapter.  11010 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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