Chapter

Art and Morality (2)

A. E. Denham

in Metaphor and Moral Experience

Published in print July 2000 | ISBN: 9780198240105
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680076 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240105.003.0011

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs

Art and Morality (2)

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It is now clear that works of literary art can inform moral judgements, contributing to their justifiability and their truth. This chapter suggests how certain features of metaphor can be extended to explain the positive epistemic value of fiction and its special contributions to the epistemic credentials of moral experience. Moral judgements are truth-apt, where ‘truth’ is construed in minimalist terms. Moral properties are a species of response-dependent ones (where a response-dependent property is just one satisfying a response-dependent concept). Unlike secondary qualities, however, they are not sensible simples and nor are they objects of any distinctive perceptual faculty. While the subjective imagination provides a degree of access to the phenomenological features of others' experience, it is not a necessary condition for the possession of concepts of experience and other ‘experience-dependent’ concepts.

Keywords: metaphor; truth; fiction; moral experience; moral judgements; imagination; figurative language; literary art

Chapter.  10581 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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