Chapter

Practical Justification

Rowland Stout

in Things That Happen Because They Should

Published in print October 1996 | ISBN: 9780198240631
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680212 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240631.003.0005

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs

Practical Justification

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This book presented a generalised version of the causal theory of action known as the Teleological Theory of Action. This says that activity constitutes action in virtue of being explainable in terms of a practical justification of it. This chapter shows that one can get this Teleological Theory of Action to work with a purely externalist conception of practical justification. It argues that the availability of this externalist story for action is what constitutes agency, and that an account of intentional mental states can be derived from it. The notion of means-end justification that the book mentioned earlier has been an externalist one; but it does not claim that there is anything there that someone with an internalist conception of means-end justification need object to.

Keywords: causal theory of action; Teleological Theory of Action; practical justification; externalist conception; intention; mental states

Chapter.  13092 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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