Chapter

Agency

Rowland Stout

in Things That Happen Because They Should

Published in print October 1996 | ISBN: 9780198240631
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680212 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240631.003.0006

Series: Oxford Philosophical Monographs

Agency

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According to the Teleological Theory of Action, activity constitutes an action in virtue of being teleologically explainable — it constitutes action if it happens because it should. This chapter explains this theory of action in more detail. It considers what ‘constitutes’ amounts to in this formulation of the theory. More specifically, it wants to know what precisely is the relation between this activity which is teleologically explainable and the action that can be identified in virtue of the availability of such an explanation. First, it is worth reconsidering as well whether the theory needs to be stated in terms of explanation at all.

Keywords: Teleological Theory of Action; activity; action; theory of action; explanation; virtue

Chapter.  10945 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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