Chapter

The Self

David Hodgson

in The Mind Matters

Published in print February 1993 | ISBN: 9780198240686
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680236 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240686.003.0018

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

The Self

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Each person tends to see himself or herself as a single conscious subject or self, with identity and continuity over time, and with no other or rival subject involved in the same brain. This chapter pursues the topic further, attempting to justify its preoccupation with conscious subjects or selves, rather than complete physical-mental persons. It looks briefly at Descartes's famous argument for the existence of selves, and at how this fares from the consensus viewpoint. Next, it outlines philosopher Derek Parfit's reductionist view of the self, which seems to be the plausible outcome of the consensus approach. Finally, it cites reasons for holding that, contrary to Parfit's view, there is a deep further fact of personal identity or continuity, over and above physical and psychological continuity as generally understood.

Keywords: persons; selves; Descartes; mind theory; Derek Parfit

Chapter.  13422 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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