Chapter

Varieties of <i>de re</i> Thought

Kent Bach

in Thought and Reference

Published in print February 1994 | ISBN: 9780198240778
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680267 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240778.003.0003

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

Varieties of de re Thought

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The previous chapter proposed a way of schematizing the general form of de re thought and characterized the de re representations and relations associated with each of the three kinds of de re thought: perception-based, memory-based, and communication-based. This chapter takes up the last two cases in more detail. They are interesting in their own right and will also serve to clarify the author's account. The discussion of them will include some concrete illustrations of why the insights underlying the causal theory of names properly belong to the theory of singular thought. At the end of the chapter, in order to highlight certain of the distinctive features of the author's, this is compared with the approach taken by Evans, which might seem at first glance to be similar. The underlying difference arises from the distinction between identifying an object and merely thinking of one, and it is argued that the identity of the object of a de re thought does not depend on one's belief about its identity.

Keywords: de re thought; identity; singular thought; causal theory of names; Evans

Chapter.  8440 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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