Subject and Predicate

W. J. Mander

in An Introduction to Bradley's Metaphysics

Published in print April 1994 | ISBN: 9780198240907
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680298 | DOI:
Subject and Predicate

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This chapter examines F. H. Bradley's view of the nature of thought and why it is so different from reality. In calling thought abstract or universal, Bradley wishes to bring to the fore the fact that it is essentially divisive. Thought works by taking reality and carving off, or abstracting, some aspect from it. For Bradley, no system of thought can ever be identical with reality. The consequence of this situation is that no thought in principle can ever be wholly and ultimately true. Bradley tries to demonstrate this fact by showing that the pluralist or relational way of thought is unavoidably subject to internal incoherence and self-contradiction. As such, he claims it could never be adequate, or true of reality. The subject-predicate schema is to be found in two separate but parallel forms—that is, as a thesis about the nature of thought and as a thesis about the nature of reality. Bradley argues against both of these.

Keywords: F. H. Bradley; philosophy; metaphysics; logic; thought; reality; subject; predicate; grammar

Chapter.  11132 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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