Chapter

The Naturalistic Fallacy: The Logic of its Refutation

Arthur N. Prior

in Logic and the Basis of Ethics

Published in print March 1963 | ISBN: 9780198241577
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680380 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198241577.003.0001
The Naturalistic Fallacy: The Logic of its Refutation

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This chapter discusses and explains what Professor G. E. Moore calls naturalistic fallacy, and what he considers to be involved in its fallaciousness. The chapter also gives reasons regarding Moore’s argument, not as disproving ethical naturalism itself, but as exposing an inconsistency into which some naturalists have fallen. Naturalistic fallacy is defined by Moore as the assumption that because some quality or combination of qualities invariably and necessarily accompanies the quality of goodness, or is invariably and necessarily accompanied by it, or both, this quality or combination of qualities is identical with goodness.

Keywords: Professor G. E. Moore; naturalistic fallacy; fallaciousness; argument; ethical naturalism; naturalists; quality of goodness

Chapter.  4176 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

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