Chapter

Aquinas: Practical Reason and Prudence

TERENCE IRWIN

in The Development of Ethics: Volume 1

Published in print September 2007 | ISBN: 9780198242673
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680519 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242673.003.0022

Series: Development of Ethics

Aquinas: Practical Reason                         and Prudence

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Examination of Thomas Aquinas' account of natural law brings this chapter back to some questions about practical reason. The account of virtue that accords primacy to will and practical reason fits into Aquinas' claims about the will. He argues that it is distinctive of rational agents to choose freely, by deliberation in the light of the ultimate end. Questions about the scope of prudence takes the chapter back to the discussion of Aristotle. In clarifying Aquinas' views on these questions, the chapter clarifies his views on the rational character of the will. Further, in contrast to Aristotelian and eudaemonist positions, claims about universal conscience and natural law might seem to force Aquinas in a different direction. However he argues that they do not. All reasonable claims about moral insight derived from these sources can be understood, in his view, within the deliberative account of practical reason. This deliberative account expresses Aquinas' reductive claim that there is nothing more to the understanding of morality than the understanding of rational agency.

Keywords: Thomas Aquinas; practical reason; will; deliberation; ultimate end; prudence; universal conscience; natural law; morality; rational agency

Chapter.  11111 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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