Chapter

Externality: Kant and Phenomenalism

J. J. Valberg

in The Puzzle of Experience

Published in print November 1992 | ISBN: 9780198242918
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680625 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242918.003.0007
Externality: Kant and Phenomenalism

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This chapter considers the Kantian and the Phenomenalist conception of externality. The Phenomenalist wants to rid philosophy of a false conception of externality and to recapture true conception, the conception we actually use. Kant maintains that we have two conceptions of externality: an everyday ‘empirical’ conception and a ‘transcendental’ conception. These are both valid conceptions with different domains of application. The former applies to what Kant often calls ‘outer appearances’, the latter to ‘things-in-themselves’.

Keywords: true conception; Kant; Phenomenalism; conceptions of externality

Chapter.  5656 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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