Chapter

S<sub>2</sub> Without S<sub>1</sub>: What Aristotle Should Have Said

Daniel W. Graham

in Aristotle's Two Systems

Published in print October 1990 | ISBN: 9780198243151
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680649 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243151.003.0010

Series: Clarendon Paperbacks

S2 Without S1: What Aristotle Should Have Said

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This chapter attempts to discover what the real essence substance is for S2, and thus construct the basis for a consistent hylomorphic substantialism. It argues that when Aristotle identifies form with substance in S2 he makes an unnecessary and damaging concession to Platonism. The most striking evidence against reductionism is the fact that when Aristotle adopts reductionistic assumptions his position generated antinomies. Discussions in this chapter include: claims of form such as form and psychology, form of theology, form and value theory; problems with Aristotle's Platonism such as the following three problems (metaphysical, epistemological, and causal); Platonism and the One Under Many; the composite as primary substance such as matter as substance, the middle way, analysis and reductionism, reconciling S2 and S1; and resolving the antinomies of substance.

Keywords: essence substance; hylomorphic substantialism; Platonism; reductionism; antinomies; composite

Chapter.  11088 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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