This chapter discusses what could follow for the case of hedonism after the issues presented in the preceding chapters. First is that the argument relies on the assumption that several uses of pleasure in the explanation of choice are of the same sort, when they are in fact rather different. Second is that the argument relies on an over-simplified view of wanting, and third is that any defence of hedonism would have to abandon arguments that fully rely on such assumptions, which could lose apparent a priori support.

This chapter discusses what could follow for the case of hedonism after the issues presented in the preceding chapters. First is that the argument relies on the assumption that several uses of pleasure in the explanation of choice are of the same sort, when they are in fact rather different. Second is that the argument relies on an over-simplified view of wanting, and third is that any defence of hedonism would have to abandon arguments that fully rely on such assumptions, which could lose apparent a priori support.