Determinism without Tears


in The Freedom of the Will

Published in print September 1970 | ISBN: 9780198243434
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680687 | DOI:
Determinism without Tears

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There are many other arguments which claim to show us that we can be determinists without upsetting any of our notions of moral responsibility or human freedom. We may keep our concepts in different pockets. The language we use to describe actions is often different from the language we use to describe events. The conflict between free-will and determinism is illusory, because the concepts occur in different languages and so cannot come into collision. Free-will belongs to the agent's language, determinism to the spectator's. The distinction drawn between the language of agents and actions and the language of observations and events is a distinction that needs to be drawn; but, like the one that Kant drew, it is unable to resolve this particular problem.

Keywords: determinism; moral responsibility; freedom; actions

Chapter.  4169 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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