in The Freedom of the Will

Published in print September 1970 | ISBN: 9780198243434
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680687 | DOI:

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Not every prediction poses a problem for freedom. Most of our actual predictions about human actions profess both to be fallible and to be dependent on the agent concerned. There is nearly always the implicit hedge ‘unless he changes his mind’. There are three conditions which predictions must fulfil before they pose a threat to freedom: they must be infallible; they must be based on a limited range of factors, outside the Agent's control; and they must be completely specific. Only those forms of determinism that claim to satisfy these conditions need worry us.

Keywords: freedom; prediction; agent; determinism

Chapter.  1357 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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