Chapter

Self-Reference

J. R. LUCAS

in The Freedom of the Will

Published in print September 1970 | ISBN: 9780198243434
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680687 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243434.003.0022
Self-Reference

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The objection that all self-referential arguments are invalid is one that has gained much currency in the 20th century, on account of the paradoxes of Russell and others, and Russell's solution of them. Russell's paradoxes have one feature in common: somewhere or other, as the paradox is developed, some form of self-reference is involved. This naturally suggests that it is self-reference that is at fault, and if we could eliminate this, we should avoid all paradoxes as well.

Keywords: self-referential arguments; Russell; paradox

Chapter.  1720 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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