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According to the physical determinist, the conclusions which a particular man can produce as true will correspond to the theorems that can be proved in the corresponding logistic calculus. We now construct a Gödelian formula in this logistic calculus, say *L*, which cannot itself be *proved-in-the-logistic-calculus-L*. Therefore the particular human being who is, according to the physical determinist, represented by the logistic calculus *L*, cannot produce such a formula as being true. But he *can* see that it is true: any rational being could follow Gödel's argument, and convince himself that the Gödelian formula, although unprovable-in-the-logistic-calculus-*L*, was nonetheless — in fact, for that very reason — true. Therefore a human being cannot be represented by a logistic calculus, and therefore cannot be described completely in terms of physical variables, all of whose values are completely determined by the conjunction of their values at some earlier time.

*Keywords: *
Gödel;
physical determinism;
physical variables;
logistic calculus

*Chapter.*
*1610 words.*

*Subjects: *
Metaphysics

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