Chapter

Objections to the Gödelian Argument

J. R. Lucas

in The Freedom of the Will

Published in print September 1970 | ISBN: 9780198243434
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680687 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243434.003.0026
Objections to the Gödelian Argument

Show Summary Details

Preview

The application of Gödel's theorem to refute physical determinism has been much criticized. The objections fall into three groups. It is objected, first, that too formal and deductive a characterization of human reasoning has been given: Gödel's theorem may apply to a calculus of deductive inferences, but most human thinking is informal and not confined to deductive patterns. Secondly the argument itself is often misconstrued. It is a so-called ‘dialectical’ argument, and it depends on a certain interplay between formal and intuitive elements, and many critics have missed the point. It is possible to reconstruct the argument more formally, but then there are a third group of objections to the use made of the notions of consistency and truth.

Keywords: Gödel; physical determinism; truth

Chapter.  1851 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.