Tarskian and Non-Tarskian Semantics

A. N. Prior

in Objects of Thought

Published in print April 1971 | ISBN: 9780198243540
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680694 | DOI:
Tarskian and Non-Tarskian Semantics

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This chapter discusses Tarski's notion of truth and falsehood. The truth and falsehood with which Tarski is concerned are genuine properties of genuine objects, namely sentences. It is essential to Tarski's procedure to consider sentences as parts of a given language, and it is only as properties of sentences of a given language that ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ are defined by him. Moreover, the predicates ‘is true’ and ‘is false’ do not themselves belong to the language consisting of the sentences of which they are predicated.

Keywords: Tarski; truth; falsehood; sentences

Chapter.  3900 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

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