Russellian Names and Descriptions

A. N. Prior

in Objects of Thought

Published in print April 1971 | ISBN: 9780198243540
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680694 | DOI:
Russellian Names and Descriptions

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This chapter considers a second theory concerning the conditions under which a belief can constitute a relation between a believer and an object that the belief is about. The theory is that this can occur only if the believer knows, beyond any possibility of mistake, that the object in question exists. It is perhaps easier to consider this type of theory, to begin with, in connection with saying rather than believing. The corresponding theory about saying would be broadly that X is able to say something of Y if he is in a position to refer to Y by means of a ‘logically proper name’ in Russell's sense; or that when X says that Y ϕ's, this constitutes a genuine relation between X and Y if and only if in saying that Y ϕ's, X refers to Y by means of a Russellian proper name.

Keywords: belief; relation; object; saying; Russell

Chapter.  4738 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

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