Chapter

Things that you can experience, but that can also happen to you without your experiencing them

J. M. Hinton

in Experiences

Published in print May 1973 | ISBN: 9780198244035
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191680717 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244035.003.0003

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

Things that you can experience, but that can also happen to you without your experiencing them

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter states that it characteristically requires the grammatical subject of an event to be in some sense its conscious subject, before it calls the event an experience in the ordinary biographical sense of the word. It suggests that it normally requires the subject to have a certain special kind of awareness of the event itself. It need not amount to knowledge that the event in question is occurring or has occurred, nor is such knowledge sufficient. The chapter also takes cases in which the grammatical subject of the event might not have been the conscious subject of it, because there might not have been the right sort of consciousness or awareness on his part. Then the event would not have counted as an experience. The requirement of the right sort of consciousness is only more or less built into the ordinary biographical notion of an experience in this type of case.

Keywords: subject; event; experience; awareness; consciousness

Chapter.  1939 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.