Perception-illusion disjunctions: general

J. M. Hinton

in Experiences

Published in print May 1973 | ISBN: 9780198244035
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191680717 | DOI:

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

Perception-illusion disjunctions: general

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This chapter states that by way of what is seen as an essential, very special, philosophical notion of an experience, here it concerns itself with a type of proposition to be called perception–illusion disjunction. It suggests that even if few things are certain, it is certain that there are perception–illusion disjunctions. A perception–illusion disjunction mentions the illusion of the very perception it mentions. It is perhaps surprising that perception–illusion disjunctions are not more often deliberately placed in the centre of the picture, in the philosophy of perception. Philosophers do quite often introduce the notion of an experience-report as that of a statement, or even the statement, which is true both when one perceives a given thing and when one has the illusion of doing so. This makes it sound as if they had in mind a perception–illusion disjunction. One has only to ask them whether they do, to find that they do not.

Keywords: notion; experience; perception; illusion; perception–illusion disjunctions; statement

Chapter.  663 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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