Chapter

Some descriptions that do not apply to perception-illusion disjunctions

J. M. Hinton

in Experiences

Published in print May 1973 | ISBN: 9780198244035
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191680717 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244035.003.0009

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

Some descriptions that do not apply to perception-illusion disjunctions

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This chapter considers a number of descriptions that hardly apply to those, or any other, perception–illusion disjunction. It sees by way of contrast that others of the descriptions which have been thought to apply to the suppositious class of ‘experience-reports’ do not apply to any perception–illusion disjunctions. This will raise the question whether there is anything to which these descriptions do apply. Something that was deliberately introduced as a paraphrase of a perception–illusion disjunction could, in a sense, ‘answer the question as to what happened to the subject’. It would be over-scrupulous to say that an explicit perception–illusion disjunction could not do so. However, there is a sense in which neither an explicit perception–illusion disjunction, nor a sentence introduced as a paraphrase for such a disjunction, answers that question, though an explicit disjunction is not as such debarred from so doing.

Keywords: perception; illusion; perception–illusion disjunctions; contrast; experience; subject; experience-reports

Chapter.  5610 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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