Chapter

The common element: general

J. M. Hinton

in Experiences

Published in print May 1973 | ISBN: 9780198244035
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191680717 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244035.003.0010

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

The common element: general

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This chapter discusses the special, philosophical notion of an experience. It was referred to as involving a form of the following general idea: that a visual experience is ‘inner’ independently of the extent to which it is given meaning by the subject's experience of life. There is truth in this general idea, if only because one's individuality is not a function of experience alone. The relevant philosophical notion, however, is a form of the general idea that the experience had by each of two people would still be ‘inner’; however, many tests or observations, of a kind which might have revealed a difference in the giving of meaning, failed to do so; and not at all because the next test or observation might have revealed such a difference.

Keywords: experience; subject; truth; individuality; tests; observations

Chapter.  1309 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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