J. M. Hinton

in Experiences

Published in print May 1973 | ISBN: 9780198244035
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191680717 | DOI:

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy


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In this chapter, requirements are laid down for what is called an R-statement; this, if there were such a thing, would be a hardcore example of a report of an ‘experience’ in the problematic conception or misconception. The ambiguous requirement might be satisfied vacuously, trivially; by the act's just being, as distinct from being the object of, a certain sort of awareness – if the act is a form of b-experiencing or sb-experiencing. If someone who speaks of visual experiences has in mind things (s)b-experienced, then one can point out that there will not be these without acts of (s)b-experiencing. It may, for all that this ambiguous requirement says to the contrary, be that the act is ca-2-experienced; is one of a kind which is somehow necessarily accompanied by one's having some suitable sort of awareness of it.

Keywords: R-statement; report; experience; conception; act; object; awareness

Chapter.  15620 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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