Chapter

Something about which nothing can be said

J. M. Hinton

in Experiences

Published in print May 1973 | ISBN: 9780198244035
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191680717 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244035.003.0012

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

Something about which nothing can be said

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This chapter dismisses the idea that there are events which would be reported by E-reports, if there were such reports, but which, in the absence of these, cannot be reported at all. It states that it does not seem that any of the trains of thought considered, as possibly leading to a belief in the existence of E-reports, can be adapted so as to become good arguments for this rather strange idea. However, it is not easy to see what else but this idea can be intended by philosophers who say that one cannot describe the sensations. They do not mean that it cannot describe the sensation which the chapter describes as the queer tickling sensation up the spine when one is a fourteen-year-old boy and the attractive art mistress looks over one's shoulder. Nor do they mean that one cannot make perception-claims and illusion-reports, or assert perception–illusion disjunctions.

Keywords: events; E-reports; sensations; perception; illusion; perception–illusion disjunctions

Chapter.  402 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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