Chapter

The Completeness Issue

L. Jonathan Cohen

in The Probable and The Provable

Published in print December 1977 | ISBN: 9780198244127
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680748 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244127.003.0004

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

The Completeness Issue

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Completeness, as a property of certain deductive systems, may be viewed as a limiting-case of probabilistic complementationality. It follows that proof criteria for incomplete systems generate probabilities that do not conform to the mathematical calculus of chance. Such probabilities measure what Keynes called ‘weight’ and have a non-complementational negation principle. One such probability is that which the consequent of any generalized conditional has on the truth of its antecedent, if this probability is equated with the level of inductive support that exists for the generalization. This concept is shown to play an important part in the way in which lay juries are expected to assess proofs of fact in Anglo-American lawcourts.

Keywords: completeness; probabilistic complementationality; proof criteria; mathematical calculus of chance; weight; Anglo-American lawcourts

Chapter.  5728 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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