Chapter

The Case against a Mathematicist Account of Judicial Probability

L. Jonathan Cohen

in The Probable and The Provable

Published in print December 1977 | ISBN: 9780198244127
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191680748 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244127.003.0012

Series: Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy

The Case against a Mathematicist Account of Judicial Probability

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This chapter investigates the case against a mathematicist account of judicial probability. It considers the influence of accumulated anomalies. Each of the six anomalies in a mathematicist analysis of juridical proof might be tolerable on its own. But together, they constitute a reason for preferring an analysis of juridical proof that is not confronted by such anomalies — if an analysis of this kind is available. It does not disputed that a mathematicist analysis may fit the actual procedures illegitimately employed by some lawyers or triers of fact, or that it might fit the correct procedures in a suitably altered legal system. But at present the laymen who serve on juries must be presumed capable of operating with a different concept of probability than the mathematical one.

Keywords: judicial probability; mathematicist analysis; anomalies; juridical proof; lawyers; triers; legal system

Chapter.  2109 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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